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ARMS, AGENCIES AND ACCOUNTABILITY: THE CASE OF OCCAR 
The establishment of OCCAR, the European multinational arms procurement 
agency raises interesting questions about its accountability and legitimacy. Is 
it right for such an agency to procure arms? This paper examines the 
arguments about methods of accountability deemed more appropriate for 
agencies like OCCAR than just examining traditional parliamentary 
accountability. It then examines OCCAR through this lens of analysis. 
Finally, it rejects these suggestions as inadequate for failing to include an 
ideational component and argues that this is necessary for legitimacy 
especially in the politically sensitive area of defence and security. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Questions of accountability are frequently raised in the current governance debate 
in Europe1. As European integration deepens and globalising forces, though contested, 
seem to prevail, both the ability of parliaments to scrutinise executive actions and the 
executive’s ability to influence events seem to have weakened. Accountability has 
traditionally been defined as ‘the legal obligation to be responsive to the legitimate 
interests of those affected by decisions, programs and interventions’2. Reformers 
therefore have frequently used the term accountability to imply the need for a 
strengthened parliamentary accountability, in the form of greater or more effective 
scrutiny of the executive by the legislature. It is though a theoretically embedded concept, 
with each theory producing various conflicting models of accountability, and as such is 
difficult to assess the accountability of any one body. For the purposes of this paper, 
however, concepts of accountability developed within the public management school of 
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debate will be used to illustrate the questions of accountability posed by the arms 
procurement agency OCCAR (Organisme Conjoint de Coopération en Matière 
d’Armement). The new public management debate has shown that there are also 
dimensions of economic and ‘customer’ accountability, which need consideration. 
Questions such as whether audit evidence shows that public money has been spent 
correctly and efficiently and whether the ‘customer’ has received the service or goods 
that were ordered punctually and in full, have become increasingly pertinent to the 
governance debate. Concepts of transparency and legitimacy have also gained importance 
in the debate, and have become closely associated with the concept of accountability. 
 In recent years the new public management agenda has, most notably in Britain, 
pushed for the establishment of agencies – an operational unit delivering government 
services outside of a ministry. Agencies have generally been established to mobilise 
special expertise, the need to ensure the credibility of public action and the need for 
visibility to allow an issue to be identified with a specific public agent3. These needs have 
also been identified at the European Union level4. However, the establishment of 
agencies has also raised the question of accountability, most notably parliamentary 
accountability5. The case of OCCAR, the multinational arms procurement agency, offers 
particular challenges to accountability, as its powers are devolved from existing national 
armaments agencies, who in turn have been ceded their powers by their respective 
ministries of defence. The sensitivity of the policy area also adds an importance to the 
accountability dilemma as questions of national security and the secrecy this brings have 
also to be addressed. Equally, more than one national accountability system is involved 
which increases the complexity. Furthermore, it is not clear that democratic control really 
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extends to defence policy in general, and weapons acquisition in particular, in West 
European countries. The distribution of power is firmly weighted towards the executive 
and away from the legislative. 
 There is an implicit if not explicit assumption in much of the literature that 
accountability should be both democratic and participatory frequently with the linked 
assumption that this provides legitimacy. New forms of governance, such as 
performance-based management, public-private partnerships and indeed supranational 
institutions, which rely on forms of shared accountability, challenge this normative 
assumption. These governance networks of independent organisations blur vertical lines 
of accountability from implementing official to responsible minister held to account by 
parliament, and it is argued, take insufficient account of traditional forms of 
representative democracy6. This in turn raises the question of whether even if such bodies 
are judged accountable, they are also judged to be legitimate. This suggests two research 
questions for this paper; firstly, can OCCAR be considered an ‘accountable’ organisation 
and so this paper will examine OCCAR’s economic and customer accountability levels as 
well as its political accountability. Secondly, is this accountability sufficient to ensure 
that OCCAR is viewed as a transparent and legitimate body? 
 
WHAT IS OCCAR7? 
 
Although the Organisme Conjoint de Coopération en Matière d’Armement 
(OCCAR) was formally created in November 1996, the Franco-German meeting at 
Baden-Baden in December 1995 is often cited as its origin. Its roots though, can be traced 
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to a decision taken by the Franco-German Defence and Security Council in Mulhouse on 
the 31st May 1994 to move ahead and create an organisation to co-operate on arms 
procurement. This followed a statement in December 1993 by the French and German 
Ministries of Defence, which originally suggested such a move, away from multinational 
program offices towards an integrated management, structure. This decision was taken 
partly to improve the efficiency of Franco-German co-operation in this area by founding 
a centre of expertise in collaborative project management, partly to create a visible 
symbol of their political commitment to co-operation in this area, but also in frustration at 
the slow progress made by the WEU in European arms co-operation8. In other words, it 
fits the rationale for agency creation. As early as the November 1994 report by the French 
and German Armaments Directors, the shape of OCCAR was already becoming clear. A 
limited central organisation would be charged with overseeing financial and 
administrative business, while program directors would run the programs at their bases. 
The organisation was envisaged as a part of the WEU. The administrative shape of the 
organisation, along with its judicial status and financial arrangements and the principles 
on which it would rest, had already been planned as can be seen in the September 1994 
plan. The decision to base its administrative headquarters in Bonn was taken in July. 
There was therefore already a clear plan in place before Italy and the United Kingdom 
joined the fledgling organisation in November 1996. The Baden-Baden meeting in 1995 
between Chancellor Kohl and President Chirac decided to proceed with the plan and to 
announce it officially along with a co-operative agreement on military satellites (which 
Germany later pulled out of). 
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 From relatively early on it was clear that the agency would be based on certain 
principles laid out at Baden-Baden; 
‘The first insists on the pre-eminence of cost-efficiency criteria in the choice 
of industries. The second highlights the necessity of long-term harmonisation 
of not only the needs of the users but also different technology policies. The 
third principle fixes as an objective, an affirmation of the European industrial 
base on a basis of a strong increase in competitiveness. The fourth principle 
explicitly provides for the abandonment of juste retour by program and 
suggests a search for a more global equilibrium carried over several projects 
over several years. Finally, the fifth principle is a principle of openness 
carrying the possibility of other countries participating in the structure. The 
required condition, apart from the acceptance of the principles, is significant 
participation in a program being co-operatively run inside the structure.’9  
These principles broke with the inefficiencies associated with European armaments co-
operation by rejecting juste retour. Interestingly as well, despite much rhetoric for and 
against on all sides, there is no specific, binding commitment to a European preference in 
the agreement document on structure and working principles10. Instead there was 
agreement that an OCCAR member would give preference to procuring equipment that it 
had helped to develop. The principles were accepted quickly by Italy and the United 
Kingdom who were keen to join.  
 The new armaments agency was in fact widely hailed as a move towards more 
efficient European armaments co-operation. OCCAR was seen by the participating states 
as a break with the inefficiencies of the past as it incorporated new techniques on 
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decision-making, work share and procurement authority. OCCAR was to have the powers 
to issue contracts on behalf of participating states and to run the procurement procedure. 
This offered a number of savings. For example, rather than having a Program Director 
from each country participating in a collaborative project, there would be a single 
Executive Director.  Qualified majority voting was also to be introduced into some 
decisions. As Reda writes, 
‘OCCAR is exploring a more flexible decision making process. Although the 
principle of unanimity still stands for existing programs and partners, there is 
a move away from consensus decision making…. If successful, it will be a 
monumental step in the democratic decision making process with applications 
to other forums and industries.’11  
This would certainly enhance the efficiency of co-operative projects. The idea also was to 
associate OCCAR with the best ideas in defence procurement. As it says in Article 24 of 
the Convention: ‘OCCAR shall aim to adopt best practices for procurement and shall 
work with Member States to benchmark procurement practices against the highest 
standards.’12 The idea seems to aim for recognition of OCCAR as a model of best 
practice in defence procurement in general, not just in collaborative projects. Naturally, 
there were also political motives; OCCAR was hailed as the start of a European 
Armaments Agency by some and as a way to preserve European defence industry by 
others. Interviewees though have suggested that, following the accession of Italy and the 
United Kingdom, the overtly political or federalist angle became progressively less 
important. It was also felt that the retirement of the French and German armaments 
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directors, who had initiated the project, had lessened its politicisation, and led to a 
concentration on more practical matters.  
 There were several major obstacles to be overcome before OCCAR could start 
work. Firstly, its relationship to the WEU, the EU and NATO had to be clarified. After 
difficult discussions, OCCAR became an independent organisation with a legal 
personality on 28 January 2001. Originally, the plan had been for the organisation to be a 
part of the WEU. NATO and more recently the EU have been broadly supportive of its 
establishment. Secondly, the rules on OCCAR acquisition had to be formulated. 
Interestingly, the OCCAR states decided to write a new set of rules rather than import a 
system of acquisition (although each state naturally wished to incorporate as many 
features of their national system as possible), thus following the idea behind European 
Union integration of establishing an acquis communautaire.  This plan was aimed at 
removing many of the problems with different budgeting and audit procedures, financial 
years, and procurement processes among other factors that had dogged earlier 
collaborative projects13. Setting up these new rules and regulations has taken rather 
longer than at first expected. It was always going to be hard to formulate multinational 
rules. Schmitt graphically describes the potential pitfalls in such an approach, 
‘The procurement process is a complex decision-making process in which 
lots of different military, political and industrial interests participate. To bring 
together the varying interests is hard enough at national level. If more 
national decision-making processes must be brought together the difficulty 
increases exponentially with the number of participants. Mostly the devil lies 
in the detail. Geo-political considerations mean different requirements and 
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even when the same thing is wanted different military doctrines mean that 
different things are wanted from the same system. On top of that diverging 
procurement philosophies and competing industrial interests make multi-
national procurement rules hard to formulate.’14  
Nevertheless after a slow start, OCCAR agreed its management procedures. It currently 
manages a variety of programs including TIGER (helicopter), MRAV/GTK/PWV (multi-
role armoured vehicle), FSAF (surface to air anti missile system family), COBRA 
(counter battery radar), MILAN (anti-tank missile) and ROLAND (surface to air missile) 
and the A400M (military transport aircraft). The possible integration of a range of other 
programs and involvement in early phase activity e.g., Technology Demonstration 
Programs (TDPs) is foreseen by the signatories to the Convention. Additional programs 
currently under active consideration for integration into OCCAR are the PAAMS ship-
based air to air missile system and the TRIFOM missile program. After initial scepticism, 
OCCAR seems to have become an established part of the European armaments policy 
scene, although the extent of savings that it achieves in comparison to former 
collaborative projects will not be clear for some time. Where OCCAR has been most 
successful (compared to the stalled WEU attempts) is in pushing the states to harmonise 
procurement principles and rules. As an organisation with no policy role, but merely 
tasked to manage projects, it has not threatened national sovereignty on defence and thus 
has been able to progress in a way that the more politically ambitious WEAO has not. 
Nevertheless, OCCAR only handles a very small part of the national procurement 
programs of its members. Jean-Yves Helmer (Director of the French armaments agency 
DGA) expects it only to be handling about 20% of procurement projects even in fifty 
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years time15. Recently though, some commentators have again suggested that OCCAR 
rather than the WEAO should evolve into the European Armaments Agency planned by 
the European Union.  
 
OCCAR AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
As the OCCAR Convention moved towards ratification concerns were raised about 
its accountability. Each of the countries had its own special concerns on questions related 
to accountability. German officials found it hard to accept that its regulation based 
approach is not being fully adopted, as they see anything else as less accountable 
although parliamentary scrutiny of the proposals was cursory. French officials were 
particularly anxious about OCCAR being irreproachable where confidentiality of 
information was concerned. French politicians’ concerns about accountability rested 
more on OCCAR’s concentration on economic factors rather than developing the 
political aspects through the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy as they saw 
weapons acquisition as a political as well as economic issue16. British officials were 
mainly concerned to avoid agreeing to a European preference in procurement, which 
could run contrary to their Smart Procurement commitments. British politicians though 
were particularly concerned about OCCAR’s financial and political accountability, 
warning that, 
‘The Convention grants authority to OCCAR’s Board of Supervisors to 
determine its own rules and procedures. We were concerned to establish that 
this necessary autonomy would not be allowed to conflict with the need to 
ensure that OCCAR would be both politically accountable, to this and other 
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Parliaments, and also technically accountable, through financial audit. There 
is a danger that if such accountabilities are lacking, OCCAR may simply 
become another extravagant, self-serving and purposeless international 
bureaucracy in the way that many similar bodies have in the past…. 
However, we remain to be convinced that accountability within OCCAR, and 
between OCCAR and the governments of its member states, is sufficiently 
well-defined.’17  
The Defence Select Committee did though recommend that the OCCAR Convention be 
ratified as did their French equivalents. Both parliaments though ratified the convention 
in early 2000. The German parliament had already voted to approve the convention on 4th 
November 1999, and it came into force with Italy’s ratification on 17th July 2000.  
Accountability can, though as argued above, be defined in different ways. OCCAR 
itself clearly feels that it is accountable, defining its accountability thus, 
‘Q3. Is OCCAR really accountable? 
A.: Yes. The OCCAR Convention sets out the accountability of the 
Organisation to the Member States. In addition the OCCAR-EA Director's 
Terms of Reference set out clearly that he is accountable to the BoS [Board of 
Supervisors] for Programs managed by OCCAR-EA. To enable this 
accountability to work, existing Programs will have legally binding 
agreements between OCCAR and the Participating States. These will set 
exactly what the Participating States expect of OCCAR, and the degree of 
empowerment that is required to allow OCCAR to be fully accountable for 
the Programs it manages. OCCAR-EA also produces an Business Plan which 
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is reviewed annually by the BoS and which sets out the targets for the 
organisation.’18  
On the other hand, although there has not been a great deal of NGO attention paid to 
OCCAR, some activists have posed the question; ‘Should an international body, one step 
away from democratic accountability, be buying weapons?’ 19. These two statements 
show such differing concepts of accountability in this context that they merit attention. 
While the OCCAR executive clearly view accountability in its narrowest sense, the NGO 
is questioning its legitimacy and transparency of purpose. These are questions that 
deserve answers. This paper will examine the accountability of OCCAR in three areas, 
economic accountability, accountability to customers and political or parliamentary 
accountability and then ask whether this is sufficient. 
 
ECONOMIC ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
 The use of the term ‘economic accountability’ implies the systems in place to 
check that public money has been spent correctly and efficiently. There are various 
procedures in place to ensure that this happens. Firstly, an annual audit of OCCAR must 
take place. Plans for internal and external evaluations of programs are also in place. 
Secondly, the director must present an annual activity report reporting on progress 
against the strategic plan, with the audit report, to the Board of Supervisors (comprising 
the National Armaments Directors for routine business but relevant ministers if deemed 
necessary). Thirdly, national auditors are allowed full access to the files of the programs 
their country is participating in to allow them to complete national audit requirements 
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(OCCAR Convention, 1998: Chapter XIII)20. How this is then reported to national 
administrations and parliaments depends on the country. In Britain, for example, the audit 
evidence of OCCAR managed projects will be reported on in the annual Major Projects 
Report by the National Audit Office to Parliament. The Defence Select Committee has 
begun to scrutinise this audit evidence in annual reports. British auditors have suggested 
that adding a series of performance monitoring indicators to be reported on by OCCAR 
could strengthen this system. They suggested the following indicators; out-turn cost 
against approved expenditure, achieved in-service date against originally approved in-
service date, performance level on entry-to-service against endorsed requirement, annual 
percentage reduction in program office operating costs and central office percentage 
overhead21. Additional safeguards will be provided through the contracts signed between 
OCCAR and participating states for each program. These legally binding agreements will 
set out exactly what participating states can expect from OCCAR. It is however, difficult 
to envisage a situation where a state took legal action against OCCAR. 
 Despite all of this, there are limitations to the extent to which OCCAR can be 
seen as a truly independent and thus economically accountable agency, unaffected by 
government decisions. One concern of industry for example was; 
“Industry would also like to be assured that governments are prepared to 
make visible their full commitment to projects being run by OCCAR i.e. that 
a company signing a contract with OCCAR can be assured that the 
governments will fully fund the program concerned and will not allow 
political factors to interfere with its progress.” (Defence Select Committee, 
1999: 25) 
 14 
However, as one WEU rapporteur explained,  
‘Similarly, the harmonization of procurement policies has been only a relative 
success, since those policies are still subject to fluctuations in national 
defence budgets. French Defence Minister Alain Richard explained this to the 
French Senate: "Let us be frank. Our different countries, notwithstanding 
OCCAR, will continue to choose their own defence procurement programs. If 
a country takes the sovereign decision in a parliamentary framework to 
reduce its defence budget, then this will mean reviewing contracts which have 
already been placed".’22  
This uncertainty will always make it difficult for parliaments, NGOs, auditors and indeed 
the governments to truly hold OCCAR to account. Equally, the rigor of the audits, the 
extent of information presented to parliaments23 and the level of scrutiny afforded to this 
information will vary from country to country according to local practice, priorities and 
interests. 
 
ACCOUNTABILITY TO CUSTOMERS 
 
 OCCAR’s real customers are the armed forces of the participating countries in 
any project. However, it only deals with them through the conduit of national 
procurement agencies. As has always been the case with collaborative projects, the 
compromise of national requirements / wishes to formulate a joint project does anyway 
increase the risk that the armed forces will not receive the equipment they felt that they 
had requested. This has already been a problem with the MRAV program as Kolb argues, 
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‘More recently, the tripartite infantry combat vehicle project (involving 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom) was also plagued by all the 
problems of co-operation. As a result of operational and technical 
compromises among the different countries, the vehicle is considered to be 
too heavy, too high and ill adapted to urban combat situations. The need to 
reconcile France's desire - to impose its own transmission system and a load 
capacity (11 men) dictated by French military standards - with German 
standards calling for a relatively powerful vehicle, led to a compromise which 
was unsatisfactory but difficult to renegotiate, even after France had left the 
program.  
In such cases where different operational requirements go hand in hand with 
unilateral technical choices, OCCAR's action will remain marginal. Only 
when the various armed forces have the same operational requirements for 
common operations will it be possible to define a satisfactory common 
denominator under the auspices of a body like OCCAR.’24  
However, this situation is not really OCCAR’s failure to be accountable to its customers 
but rather the failure of the national procurement agencies to liaise sufficiently well with 
their armed forces. This situation of ‘shared accountability’ between OCCAR and 
national procurement agencies would also apply to overdue or faulty equipment. 
Essentially, as OCCAR is another layer between the armed forces and defence suppliers 
the chain of customer accountability is bound to be somewhat confusing and less than 
transparent. Is this necessarily a problem? Looking at the national procurement agencies, 
a problem has only really arisen when they came to identify more with the interests of the 
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defence suppliers. This should also hold true for OCCAR, but should be less of a risk as 
it has a clear role limited to procurement, which is not the case for the national agencies. 
Nevertheless, though shared accountability with respect to outcomes is inevitable in this 
field, it does blur accountability and make it more difficult for external scrutinisers to 
hold the correct person/body to account. 
 
POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
When we consider OCCAR’s political accountability, it is hard to see how a 
minister reasonably could be held to account for its failings by any parliament. However, 
this is more or less true of any agency, and has not really been regarded as a major 
problem in Europe with the exception of the UK, where a clear chain of ministerial 
responsibility has traditionally been seen as highly important. OCCAR’s existence has 
though helped to highlight the inadequacy of parliamentary scrutiny of armaments issues. 
In the post-1945 period there has been little evidence of adequate scrutiny of the 
executive on armaments policy in most European countries. As Snyder writing in the 
1960s argued, the problem of legislators receiving inadequate information on defence 
policy is at least equalled by their lack of interest in the subject25. Even when 
parliamentarians have questioned weapons programs, this has predominantly been on a 
cost rather than basic purpose level. Until recently, this has been particularly true of 
Britain and France, although both countries have in recent years increased their levels of 
scrutiny. Even in Germany where parliamentary scrutiny of armaments programs has 
been much more active26, the distaste of many politicians for the subject led to them 
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introducing a dense web of procedures and regulations governing acquisition rather than 
setting policy. In effect therefore a small elite group consisting of bureaucrats, the 
military and defence industrial figures has made weapons acquisition policy. However, 
good the audit evidence or other information made available to parliaments is, if 
parliamentarians do not then use it, accountability is weakened. In other words, however 
good the procedures for accountability are, unless a culture of critical scrutiny exists there 
is little point to them. 
However there is one area of concern, where the existence of OCCAR may 
damage parliamentary scrutiny, is the increased pressure it puts on national governments 
to sign up to collaborative projects. The behaviour of the German government over the 
A400M project illustrates this perfectly. They, under pressure from their partners, agreed 
to purchase 73 of the aeroplanes, and under OCCAR’s rules would face financial 
penalties if they tried to renege on this agreement. The problem was that the German 
Bundestag had only formally agreed to the purchase of a first tranche of 40 aeroplanes as 
they thought they should not prejudge the next German parliament’s right to make 
budgetary decisions. Bundestag members were understandably furious at this and some 
opposition members took s case to the Constitutional Court, and there were calls on all 
sides for the Defence Minister, Rudolf Scharping’s resignation27. Eventually, the 
government managed to persuade the Bundestag to agree by offering a compromise. The 
compromise removed a pledge to pay damages to its international partners in the Airbus 
project if Germany does not buy all the 73 planes it has ordered (their order has now been 
cut to 60), which understandably irritated the other partners. The A400M incident though, 
shows that even for the German government itself, the Bundestag’s scrutiny of 
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procurement projects was a nuisance in the OCCAR structure and to be circumnavigated 
it possible. 
As can be seen from the arguments above, in many ways OCCAR is accountable 
for its actions. Even the areas where it may appear to fail in this, are problem areas of 
accountability common to any collaborative project. The benefits of collaboration for 
example will always have to be weighed up against the disadvantage of the need to 
compromise on requirements. In fact, the establishment of clear procedures to make 
OCCAR accountable, in at least the financial sense, should enable Parliaments to 
scrutinise more fully collaborative projects than they have been able to in the past. 
OCCAR’s establishment though has reinvigorated debate around the need for more 
adequate parliamentary oversight of weapons acquisition: a debate which had already 
gained some momentum in at least the British and French parliaments. If this debate 
helps to foster a culture of critical scrutiny of weapons acquisition, it is to be greatly 
welcomed. The question though needs to be asked as to whether simple accountability is 
really sufficient. 
 
BUT IS ACCOUNTABILITY ENOUGH? 
 
 If all these procedures are carried out and parliamentarians exercise their right of 
scrutiny, then OCCAR is broadly accountable, but this does not answer the question 
posed by Hills of, “Should an international body, one step away from democratic 
accountability, be buying weapons?”28. This questions the legitimacy of OCCAR’s 
purpose and implicitly the transparency of the decision to establish it.  It is also a 
question that will become increasingly pertinent as the demands of ESDP’s Rapid 
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Reaction Force begin to mean that decisions on how to manage weapons acquisition 
within a European framework have to be taken. Thus far, the record is not looking 
promising for transparency; the vagueness surrounding ESDP’s military doctrine, or 
POLARM’s (Council working group on armaments policy) shadowy proceedings being 
excellent examples of the problem. The need to equip the Rapid Reaction Force while 
increasing defence spending as little as possible, will inevitably result in more pressure 
for privatisation or ‘agency-isation’ of military functions to achieve the needed savings 
elsewhere. The British government’s Green Paper on Private Military Companies and 
their potential use in peacekeeping operations is a prime if extreme example of this 
phenomenon. The legitimacy of these moves will inevitably be questioned by NGOs and 
other citizens, particularly if the transparency of the decision-making process is (as 
present) not such that a plurality of opinions is given equal access. Effective civilian 
control over military force has been considered a cornerstone of democratic government, 
but traditional methods to ensure this are being challenged by the Europeanisation of 
defence and security and by the new governance agenda. The real challenge will be to 
find new ways of ensuring this democratic control continues. Unless solutions can be 
found, there would seem to be grave challenges of legitimacy, which could potentially be 
levelled at ESDP and its consequences. 
 These issues mesh well with the contemporary theoretical debate, which in the 
context of the EU, recognises the importance of normative legitimation and argues for an 
ideational component to be added to performance-or institution-based measures of 
accountability29. Many would argue that such normative legitimation could only take 
place if there is more citizen or civil society participation in decision-making. Constraints 
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of national or EU security do constrain the extent to which defence policy-making can be 
fully open. However, it is increasingly noticeable that while arms firms have an open 
door to decision-makers, this is not the case for those sections of civil society dealing 
with the consequences of weapons use and proliferation. This imbalance may well 
increase as the activity of private firms in the military sector increases. It would seem 
therefore that at least for policy areas that impinge on the most basic questions of 
security, that there are limits to the accountability concepts developed by the New Public 
Management school. 
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